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Grodin Joseph
The Individual and the Public Service
Enterprise in the New Industrial State
Matthew 0. Tobriner* and Joseph R. Grodin**
O uxs is a society of organization. It is a complex, interdependent
society in which knowledge and function are exceedingly specialized
and economic and political power highly centralized. The activities of
government on all levels, the technology underlying the production and
distribution of goods and services, and the control exercised by labor
unions and professional societies-these constitute ever increasing aspects
of contemporary social structure.
Such tendencies toward organization and specialization bear enormous
significance for the individual in our society. They imply increased regu-
lation of his behavior by both governmental and nongovernmental insti-
tutions, a relative decline in his control of institutional decisions affecting
his existence, and a corresponding dependence upon group action for the
expression of his political and economic interests.' The impact of these
phenomena is evident both in the extensive discussion by social scientists
of the subject and in the popularity of phrases such as "technostructure,"
"organization man," and "alienation."'
Given the dynamic nature of Anglo-American jurisprudence and its
traditional concern for the individual, it is not surprising that such
changes in social structure have been reflected at all levels of our legal
system.' Change is most obvious at the statutory level, where legislatures
for a half century have focused on regulating enterprises and relationships
to protect the individual in his role as a consumerfor example, or as an
employee.' Changes in constitutional law are also easy to discern. In-
* Associate Justice, California Supreme Court; A.B., 1924, Stanford University; M.A.,
1925, Stanford University; LL.B., 1927, Harvard University; S.J3D., 1932, University of
California. The authors wish to express appreciation to Barbara Brudno Rintala for her
research assistance on this Article.
**BA., 1951, University of California, Berkeley; LL.B., 1954 Yale University Law
School; Ph])., 1959, University of London; Member, California Bar.
1For a discussion of some of these factors, see Latham, The Commonwealth of the
Corporation, 55 Nw. UL. Rxv. 25 (1960); Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual
Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness, 55 Nw. U.L. Rv. 4 (1960). For a sociological
analysis of the effects of size and bureaucracy upon organizations and of the "iron law of
bureaucracy," see R. Mle=zLs, POIICAL Pa~rTs (1915).
2 See J. GALBRArTm, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); D. RzIzsumr, TuE LoNzrz
CROWD (1960); W. WYzTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
3 See generally W. FRIEMAN, LAW nTI A CHANGING SocIzT (1959).
4 See generally B. ScnwARTz, A CoaMNTARY oN THE CONSTITUTION OF TM UNITED
STATES, PART 2, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY (1965).
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creasing governmental involvement, for example, has blurred distinctions
between things public and private and has led to expanded definitions
of "state action," requiring application of due process and equal protec-
tion principles to seemingly private relationships. And within the area
of constitutional application, there is a noticeable trend toward increased
concern for the individual; 6 witness, for example, recent decisions in the
fields of welfare law,7 administrative law,' and criminal law.'
Recognizing such broad legal change, this Article discusses only
changes within the common law. Such changes are no more significant
than those occurring at the statutory and constitutional levels. Quite the
contrary, it is apparent that statutory change is far more pervasive and
concededly more appropriate as a means of reflecting alterations in social
conditions and public policy; shifts in constitutional doctrine are often
more dramatic and more far-reaching in their impact. Moreover, dis-
cussion of common law trends is hazardous precisely because such trends
are typically more subtle and therefore difficult to establish. We believe,
however, that such common law trends are occurring in relation to the
social changes mentioned earlier and that explicit identification of these
trends, where possible, is important to an understanding of the legal
process.
We do not, of course, attempt here to examine the entire panorama of
common law doctrines in relation to these elements of social change;
even if our knowledge permitted us to engage in such a project, limita-
tions of time and space would not. Rather, our Article is limited to ex-
ploration of one thesis for explaining only some aspects of the changes
taking place. Our thesis, briefly stated, is that the common law responds
in part to the challenges of organized society by reformulating common
5See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Horowitz, Fournteenth Amendment Aspects of
Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CAL.F. L. REv. 1 (1964); Van Alstyne &
Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. RLr. 3 (1961).
6 See generally Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on
Liberty in the Welfare State (pts. 1-2), 39 WASr. L. REv. 4 (1964); 40 WASr. L. Rav. 10
(1965).
7See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 A.C.
253, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967); Syrek v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 54
Cal. 2d 519, 354 P.2d 625, 7 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1960). See also O'Neil, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALiF. L. Rav. 443 (1966); Reich, Indi-
vidual Rights and Social Welfare: the Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE LJ. 1245-46 (1965).
8 See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) ; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967); See also Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative Law, 34 GEo. WAsH L.
REv. 401 (1966).
9 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Steamer, The Court and the Criminal, 8
Wm. & M.ARY L. REV. 319 (1967). For detailed discussion of one area, see Developments in
the Lau-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935 (1966).
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law principles to impose duties and obligations on the basis of status or
relationship, and that one such reformulation involves reviving early
concepts of enterprises "affected with a public interest." We attempt to
develop the thesis in the following pages.10
I
STATUS CONCEPTS
A. Status Concepts and Early Law
The society of the Middle Ages was relatively static. The feudal
system and its agrarian economy produced a hierarchy of relationships
and a degree of economic dependence which made both social and geo-
graphic mobility difficult, at least for the lower economic strata. An
individual's "place" in society, i.e., his relationship with the establish-
ment, basically was fixed by the circumstances of his birth.
Medieval common law reflected this fairly stable social order. Its
principles rested heavily upon concepts of relationship or status; that is,
it tended to posit rights and duties upon the relationship of parties within
the socio-economic system rather than upon factors, such as consensual
agreement, dependent on the will of individual litigants.11 We inherit, in
modified form, the law of landlord and tenant, master and servant, parent
and child, and similar relationships, from that early period, which pre-
ceded modem development of contract and tort.'2
The relationship at early common law between purveyors of goods and
services and the consuming public was one of status, involving the concept
of a "public" or "common" calling or, to use a later phrase, an enterprise
"affected with a public interest."' 3 Because such enterprises "held them-
1 OWe are by no means the first to point out the resurgence of status principles in
modem law. For a classic early study see R. PoUND, T=n SLaRr or Tm CooroN LAw
(1921), and for a more recent analysis see W. F=DmrA , supra note 3. For a scholarly
critique of Sir Henry Maine's classic thesis on status and contract, see Graveson, The Move-
ment from Status to Contract, 4 MoDam L. REv. 261 (1941). An excellent sociolegal ex-
ploration of modem status principles is contained in P. Nonet, The Decline of Contract
(1964) (unpublished MA. thesis in University Library, University of California, Berkeley).
These works present, however, a somewhat different focus than is the substance of our
thesis.
11See R. Poum, supra note 10, at 20.
22 See id. at 22-25.
'
3 For discussion of the principle and its historical background, see 1 B. WrMar", PUBLac
SEavicE CoaonomNs §§ 1-5 (1911); Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Call-
ings, 75 U. PA. L. Rav. 411 (1927); Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public
Service Companies, 11 CoLur. L. Rav. 514 (1911). See generally F. HALL, THE CONCEPT
oF A Busnmtss Arracrm W=SH A PU3LIC INTMIEsT (1940). The phrase "affected with a
public interest" was apparently coined by Sir Matthew Hale in 1676. A Treatise in Three
Parts from a Manuscript of Lord Chief Justice Hale, in A CoLrcToN or TRAcrs Rar Ar=v
TO ma LAw or ENGLANm 1-248 (F. Hargrave ed. 1787).
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selves out" as providing a particular product or service to the community,
the common law attached to them certain obligations, including-at
various stages of doctrinal development-the duty to serve all customers
on reasonable terms without discrimination and the duty to provide the
kind of product or service reasonably to be expected from their economic
role.14 Such occupations as blacksmith,15 food seller,"0 veterinarian, 7 and
tailor,' 8 as well as those of common carrier 9 and innkeeper, 20 were prob-
ably included in that category. These obligations, imposed independently
of consensual agreement or negligence, gradually took form in the doctrine
of "general assumpsit," as distinguished from "special assumpsit" which
required a specific understanding or undertaking.2'
1 4 The features which at early common law distinguished those engaged in public
or common callings . . from those who were not so engaged, were the peculiar
duties laid upon persons engaged in common callings to serve all applicants for their
services, and to perform such services with care . . . . To these primary duties
there are certain corollaries, namely that the service must be reasonably adequate
and rendered upon reasonable terms, and that it must be impartial.
Burdick, supra note 13, at 515. It is likely that these various obligations arose over a period
of time. F. HALL, supra note 13, at 12.
15 "Note, that it was agreed by all the court that where a smith declines to shoe my
horse, or an innkeeper refuses, to give me entertainment at his inn, I shall have an action
on the case, notwithstanding no act is done; for it does not sound in covenant." Anonymous,
Keilway, 50, pl. 4 (K.B. 1450), reprinted in J. BEAL. & B. WYMAN, CASES ON PUBLIC
SERVICE COMPANIES 1 (1902).
16 "[A] victualler shall be compelled to sell his victual if the vendee has tendered him
ready payment, otherwise not." Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. 8, pl. 14 (CI'. 1494), reprinted in
1. Ba= & B. WX-mw, supra note 15, at 283.
17 Cf. Y.B. 19 Hen. VI 49, pl. 5 (C.P. 1441), reprinted in J. BELE & B. WnSAN, supra
note 15, at 1: "You have not shown that he is a common surgeon to cure such horses, and
therefore, although he has killed your horse by his medicines you shall have no action
against him without an assumpsit."
18 "I know well, if I put a robe with a tailor to be made ... in all cases of the sort
I may have my robe lying in the tailor's shop as long as I please . . . for he is compelled
by the law to do it, and he may by the law detain it until he is satisfied for the making."
Anonymous, Y.B. 22 Edw. 4, 49, pl. 15 (1483), quoted in B. WYmm, PuBIrc Sm RcE
CORPORATIONS § 7 (1911). -
19 Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Shower 327 (K.B. 1683), reprinted in J. BEALE & B. WY'MAN,
supra note 15 at 1.
20 See note 15 supra. For a general expression of the public service principle, see Lane v.
Cotton, 12 Mod. Rep. 472, 484-85 (1701) (Holt, CJ.):
Wherever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the benefit of the
rest of his fellow-subjects, he is eo ipso bound to serve the subject in all the things
that are within the reach and comprehension of such an office, under pain of an
action against him .... If on the road a shoe fall off my horse, and I come to a
smith to put one on, and the smith refuse to do it, an action will lie against him,
because he has made a profession of a trade which is for the public good, and has
thereby exposed and vested an interest of himself in all the king's subjects that
will employ him in the way of his trade. (a) If an innkeeper refuse to entertain a
guest where his house is not full, an action will lie against him.
21The doctrinal relationships are a bit obscure. At early law, prior to the develop-
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B. The Decline of Status
With the advent of a mercantile economy and a liberal laissez-faire
philosophy, status concepts yielded to doctrines like negligence and
contract which were more appropriate to the encouragement of mobility
and individual initiative because of their emphasis on the individual
character of relationships.' Contract, in particular, served to free indi-
viduals from static hierarchies and enabled them, through consent, to
make law for themselves. Sir Henry Maine's statement that the evolution
of law was from status to contract 3 amounted to more than description;
his famous dictum carried with it a judgment that progress lay in that
direction. Contract became a principle vehicle of individualism in a free
economy-the legal companion of economic and political liberalism. 4
The concept of an enterprise "affected with a public interest" was
eroded by the advent of the new system. With an increasing number of
services available to the general public on a competitive basis, the concept
of "holding out" lost distinctive significance, and so, while status concepts
lingered in many areas of the common law, the obligations attached to
a "public" calling survived only in a narrow category of enterprise, con-
sisting principally of innkeepers and common carriers.2 5
C. New Status Concepts
The increased organization and specialization in modern society
referred to earlier have created a gulf between social reality and the
theoretical underpinnings of our legal doctrine. The theory, for example,
ment of modern tort and contract, liability through an action on the case could be im-
posed only when an "asumpsit" and the breach thereof were pleaded. Ames, The History
of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1888). Burdick, supra note 13, at 518-19, suggests that
the obligations of a person engaged in a common calling were associated with assumpsit
doctrine, but were implied from the holding-out (a "general assumpsit") and did not have
to be specially pleaded. Arterburn, supra note 13, at 416, suggests that the obligations arose
at an earlier date and grew out of the scarcity of labor caused by the Black Death. B.
Wymi , supra note 18, at §§ 1, 35, stresses the monopoly factor characteristic of enterprises
said to be affected with a public interest. On this latter point, see also the development of
labor union cases in text accompanying notes 40-46 infra.
22W. FRima .Nq, supra note 3, at 90, 127.
23 X. MAwE, AxciENT LAw 165 (F. Pollock ed. 1906).
24 See W. FRm=aArAxn, supra note 3, at 90-91.
2 5 F. tALL, supra note 13, at 9-10. During the 1920's and 30's the concept of an enter-
prise "affected with a public interest" was briefly used for constitutional purposes, in a
somewhat static and circular manner, to define and limit the kinds of businesses which
legislatures could regulate without running afoul of substantive due process: that is, those
businesses which had been traditionally regulated by common law before the constitution
was adopted. See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 441 (1927). But gradually the
Supreme Court widened the scope of legislative discretion until it held, in effect, that for
constitutional purposes a business was affected with a public interest when a legislature
said it was. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 US. 502 (1934).
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of a laissez-faire economy providing commodities competitively in re-
sponse to consumer demands expressed through individual contracts bears
little resemblance to the process by which a large-scale enterprise deter-
mines production and distribution. 6 Nor does the ideal of individual
mobility entirely harmonize with the kinds of control exercised by trade
unions and professional societies. This is not to criticize these aspects of
our society; organization and technology inevitably affect the planning
and distribution of goods and services, while unions and professional
societies perform an obviously desirable role. Moreover, it is no longer
possible, even if it were desirable, to return to the society of the nine-
teenth century. Rather, we must recognize that in major areas of our
social existence, theory does not match the facts of life.
The discrepancy between theory and reality bears implications for
many of our legal doctrines. Contract doctrine, for example, at one time
the instrument of transition from status to individualism, may today, if
rigidly applied, produce a quite different result. Thus, an individual today
does not bargain meaningfully over a union or professional society's con-
stitution and bylaws, an automobile manufacturer's warranty, or an
insurance policy. He accepts these as given; they are part of his economic
environment. If they are contracts at all, they are "contracts of adhe-
sion, 28 imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by the party possessing
superior "bargaining" strength. Rigid reliance upon their terms as defining
legal obligations between the parties may, in effect, produce new forms
of subservience under the guise of contract. In such contexts contract law
may be said to be undergoing a functional revolution.
But if the law is to provide relief to the individual in such a situation
despite or beyond agreements purportedly governing their relationship-
and we believe the tendency of the law is in that direction-then status
law may also be said to be undergoing a functional revolution. For, in
such situations, statutory or judicial imposition of extra-contractual obli-
gations to protect the individual is equivalent to the imposition of a new,
legally created status in lieu of that sought to be imposed by the dominant
party. Thus, modern status principles may serve a vastly different func-
2 6 See J. GALBRAism, Tan Naw INDusTRi. STATE 23-26 (1967).
27 See id. at 8-9.
But, what is important is that this whole body of [public service] law was a re-
sponse to the felt needs of the times that spawned it. In our times, the interdepen-
dence of people has greatly increased; the days of laissez-faire have largely disap-
peared; men are more and more dependent on their neighbors for services as
well as for housing and the other necessities of life.
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 279 (1963) (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.).
28 See Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YArI L.J. 34 (1917); Kessler, Con-
tracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUvr. L. REv. 629
(1943); Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 CoLuXm. L. REv.
833 (1964).
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tion from those of the feudal system. They cannot duplicate the functions
originally served by contract, because that would require a drastic and
impossible regression; the choice is not between feudalism and Victorian
liberalism, but between a highly organized society with adequate protec-
tion for the individual and one without such protection.
We believe that our legal system is reviving status concepts-not from
nostalgia for a bygone society, but to meet the challenges of today-and
that one important aspect of that trend lies in the application to certain
relationships of principles originating in the "public service" doctrine dis-
cussed above. In short, certain institutions and enterprises are viewed by
the courts as quasi-public in nature:29 The important products or services
which these enterprises provide, their express or implied representations
to the public concerning their products or services, their superior bargain-
ing power, legislative recognition of their public aspect, or a combination
of these factors, lead courts to impose on these enterprises obligations to
the public and the individuals with whom they deal,3 ° reflecting the role
which they have assumed, apart from and in some cases despite the
existence of a contract. Such obligations flow from status rather than
consensual relationships between the parties. In the pages which follow,
we attempt to trace the modern development of the public service doc-
trine, first as applied to unions and professional societies through judicial
insistence upon open membership and fair treatment, and then as applied
to the relationship between purveyors of goods and services and the con-
suming public, through insistence that the product or service conform to
the reasonable expectations of the public.
Some words of caution before we begin: The concept of an enterprise
29 Characterization of an association or enterprise as "quasi-public" for purposes of
applying common law status principles is to be distinguished from such a characterization
for the purpose of applying constitutional "state action" concepts. The two are closely
related, however, and may in some situations provide alternative means for reaching
similar results. See the concurring opinions of justice Douglas in Reitman v. Mulkey, 87
S. Ct. 1627, 1634-37 (1967), and Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274-83 (1963); note
35 infra.
SOIn the contexts referred to in this Article, "public" interest may be said to embrace
the interests of the individuals involved in a particular relationship, in the sense that the
public has an interest both in seeing that justice is done with respect to such individuals and
in establishing a principle which will promote just results in other, similar situations. To
the extent that the relationship is one which affects large numbers of the public, the overlap
between private and public interests is obviously greater. In some contexts it is meaningful
to speak of an independent public interest-for example, the public's interest in having
access to qualified physicians is one which both coincides with and transcends the interests of
applicants to medical societies-and in such cases we shall attempt to identify the separate
interests involved. It is quite possible, of course, that specific public interests may conflict
with individual interests in particular situations-for example, it is by no means clear that
public interest in labor peace is served by increased membership participation within unions
,but the cases we consider here are those in which courts have found public interest and
individual interests to be compatible.
1967] 1253
HeinOnline -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 1253 1967
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
or institution affected with a public interest-we propose to call it a
"public service" concept for short-is but one aspect of the larger field
of status concepts. It is not in itself so much a rule of law as it is a tool
of understanding, a metaphor, a way of explaining what courts are doing
in a variety of situations. Although the criteria mentioned above"' appear
to influence the judicial application of a public service concept, and
various legal results appear to follow, our discussion shows that the rele-
vance and weight of individual criteria and their impact upon the results
depend heavily on the relationships and issues involved in particular fact
situations. Moreover, the decisions we shall discuss can be and typically
are explained by other legal concepts. The most we claim for our concep-
tion is that it is one way, and we believe a particularly helpful way, of
looking at certain changes which have been taking place in our common
law, of placing them in historical perspective, and thus of synthesizing
what might otherwise be regarded as unrelated legal phenomena.
II
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ORGANIZATION
As economic and political power becomes channeled through organiza-
tions, individuals become increasingly dependent upon membership and
participation in such groups as unions, professional societies, and trade
associations-" Membership in these groups is often essential to effective
3 1 See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
82 Considerations of space have resulted in limiting the scope of this Article to the kinds
of organizations listed and to their internal relationships with members and applicants for
membership, although many other organizational relationships provide equally fertile areas
for consideration of the public service concept. For discussion of the "quasi-public" nature
of business corporations, see, e.g., Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private
Groups, and the Law, 57 CoLmri. L. Rxv. 155 (1957); Latham, supra note 1; Miller, The
Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. REV. 1539 (1960).
On the relationship of corporations to shareholders, see F. EmERSoX, SAMEOLDER Dzoc-
RAcy (1954). The relationship of university to student also provides interesting analogies. See
Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HAitv. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Van Alstyne,
Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 368 (1963);
Symposium-Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CA=a. L. REv. 1 (1966). For an early
study of the relationship of private groups to government, see Jaffe, Law Making By
Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937).
We are able to touch only tangentially upon the collective bargaining relationship and
labor arbitration, which represent a striking example of the intrusion of status concepts
into the field of contract. Thus, the Supreme Court has said of the collective agreement
that "it is more than a contract; it is a generalized code" to which "meaning and content"
is given in the process of arbitration; the arbitrator's source of law "is not confined to the
express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law . . . is equally part of the
collective agreement though not expressed in it." USW v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
578, 581 (1960). See discussion in P. Nonet, supra note 10, at 61-74.
The relationship of organizations to the public generally (for example, consideration
of the effect of a strike upon the public interest) presents different sorts of issues and is
1254 [Vol. 59t: 1247
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conduct of an individual's trade or profession, and, because of the eco-
nomic and political control exercised by such groups, participation in
their affairs may be the only practical means an individual has of in-
fluencing his working environment.33 Whether or not it receives govern-
mental sanction or recognition, 4 the organization often becomes a kind
of private government, effectively determining the conditions under which
a trade or profession will be conducted.35
Obviously, the individual has little effective bargaining power with
such an organization. Absent legal assistance, he may be unable to gain
admission or, once a member, may be denied effective participation in its
affairs. The rules or policies which the organization adopts may affect
him adversely in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Realistically
viewed, the relationship is one of status rather than contract.
Such a relationship may be regarded as a "public" one because of
various factors in which the public has a legitimate interest. Protecting
the interests of the individuals affected is one public concern. Avoiding
unreasonable restraints on the practice of a trade or profession which
provides an important service or product to the public is another. More-
over, to the extent that the organization is either delegated public power36
or holds itself out as regulator or de facto spokesman for a trade or
profession 7 the public has a legitimate interest in assuring that its ac-
likewise beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Society of N.Y. Hosp. v. Hanson, 272 App.
Div. 998, 73 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1947).
3 3 See generally Comment, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
HARv. L. REV. 983, 989 (1963). On the power of medical societies, see Comment, The Ameri-
can Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALn LJ.
937 (1954).
3 4 This is the case, for example, with a labor union granted exclusive status as bargain-
ing representative by federal law. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1964), and with a medical society empowered by state statute to appoint representatives
to a state licensing board. See Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose,
and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.j. 937, 959 (1954).
35The similarity between such organizations and government, both with respect to
function and structure, often leads courts to apply rules derived from constitutional
principles. See text accompanying notes 64-71 infra, and the more detailed discussion in J.
GRoO N, UNION GOVERM NT AND THE LAw 90 (1961). The governmental analogy is to be
distinguished from the proposition that an organization may be so infused with governmental
involvement (through licensing, delegation of authority, monopoly status, etc.) that its
actions become actions of the state, warranting the direct application of constitutional
principles. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see Comment, Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REV. 983, 1055 (1963) ; cf. Oliphant v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935
(1959).
36 See note 34 supra.
37 A real estate board, for example, may represent in its advertising to the public that
it includes "ethical" realtors, and that it polices its own members with respect to ethics.
That was the situation in the cases cited in note 53 infra. The situation is similar with re-
spect to medical societies. See Comment, supra note 34, at 962-76.
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tions are reasonably representative of the trade or profession involved
and that it does not act arbitrarily or discriminately with respect to mem-
bers or applicants.
The kinds of organizations we are describing thus often meet all of
the criteria of public service status referred to in the preceding section.
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have tended in recent years
to impose obligations designed to protect the individual and public inter-
ests involved.
Traditionally, trade and professional groups were assimilated to
clubs and fraternal societies for purposes of common law rules dictating
a high degree of judicial abstention from the internal affairs of non-
profit "voluntary associations.138 Accordingly, the membership policies
of such associations were their own affair; once admitted to membership,
an individual's relationship with his organization was limited by the
group's own rules, viewed as a contract. 9 This wall of abstention, based
as it was on judicial reluctance to become embroiled in the affairs of
organizations such as church groups and fraternal societies and bearing
little relationship to the developing facts of life concerning trade and
professional societies, was destined to yield to the tides of change.
A. Admission of Members to Labor Unions
The most noticeable departure from a policy of judicial abstention
occurred in cases involving admission to labor unions, in which the
principles developed bore striking resemblance to earlier concepts of an
enterprise affected with a public interest.40 Courts began to say that a
union could not enter into closed shop agreements requiring membership
as a condition of employment and at the same time maintain an arbitrarily
closed union. The situation was analogized to that of a business affected
with a public interest at common law. Thus, the New Jersey Court of
Chancery in an early case said:
[M] onopoly raises duties which may be enforced against the possessors
of the monopoly. This has been recognized from the earliest times.
The rule that one who pursued a common calling was obliged to serve
all comers on reasonable terms, seems to have been based on the fact
that innkeepers, carriers, farriers, and the like, were few, and each
had a virtual monopoly in his neighborhood.... The question pre-
sented in the instant case is not one of prices or of serving the public
but one of employment . . . .However, the principle is the same;
38 The classic description of this judicial attitude is contained in Chafee, The Internal
Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HAv. L. Rav. 993 (1930).
39 Id. at 1001.
40 For more detailed discussion of the development, see Summers, Union Powers and
Workers' Rights, 49 MIcH. L. Rav. 805 (1951); Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47
Corm . L. Rav. 33 (1947).
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the holders of the monopoly must not exercise their power in an arbi-
trary, unreasonable manner so as to bring injury to others.41
Six years later, in James v. Marinship Corporation,2 the California
supreme court adopted similar reasoning to enjoin the Boilermakers'
Union from simultaneously enforcing a closed shop policy and a require-
ment that Negro workers belong to a separate "auxiliary" union which
allowed them no voice in determining the officers or policies of their
bargaining representative. Drawing on the New Jersey case, Justice
Gibson said:
In our opinion, an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union is
incompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has, as in this case,
attained monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed shop
agreements and other forms of collective labor action, such a union
occupies a quasi-public position similar to that of a public service busi-
ness and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer
claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or
fraternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members does
not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right to
work for a living.4 3
While Marinship was based on a finding that the union, through
closed shop agreements with local employers, had effected monopoly con-
trol, existence of such a broad monopoly subsequently was held not to
be necessary where the union controlled jobs with a particular employer.44
Still later, the California court held in effect that even job control was
not essential; in Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees & Moving Picture Machine Operators45 it ordered a union
to admit an applicant found by the court to have been arbitrarily ex-
cluded from membership without affording the union the alternative,
provided for in Marinship, of modifying its closed shop policy.
The Thorman decision thus tacitly protected the applicant's interest
in participating in union affairs, quite apart from his interest in job ac-
quisition or retention. Recently the California court gave express recog-
nition to the doctrine implied in Thorman:
4 1 Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 350-51, 197 A. 720,
722 (Ch. 1938).
42 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
43id. at 731, 155 P2d at 335 (emphasis added).
44 E.g., Williams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 629, 165 P.2d 903
(1946). The rule was also extended to prohibit discrimination for arbitrary reasons other
than race. E.g., Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944) (independent ped-
dlers); Riviello v. journeymen Barbers' Union, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948)
(self-employed barber); Thorman v. International Alliance etc. Employees, 49 Cal. 2d
629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958) (failure to win membership approval).
45 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958).
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The decisions of this court thus recognize that membership in
the union means more than mere personal or social accommodation.
Such membership affords to the employee not only the opportunity to
participate in the negotiation of the contract governing his employ-
ment but also the chance to engage in the institutional life of the
union....
.. Participation in the union's affairs by the workman compares
to the participation of the citizen in the affairs of his community.
The union, as a kind of public service institution, affords to its mem-
bers the opportunity to record themselves upon all matters affecting
their relationships with the employer; it serves likewise as a vehicle for
the expression of the membership's position on political and com-
munity issues... 46
Thus, regardless of the particular union's nature or agreement with its
members, certain obligations may be imposed on it as a "public service"
institution.
B. Admission of Members to Other Organizations
Extension of the Marinship doctrine to other types of organization
has been slow, but the trend is clearly in that direction.4 7 One of the
first cases to apply the doctrine outside the labor field was Falcone v.
County Medical Society,48 in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey
ruled that, in view of both a medical society's de facto control over access
by physicians to hospitals and the public's concern over the practice of
medicine, the society's power to exclude applicants for membership
"should not be unbridled but should be viewed judicially as a fiduciary
power to be exercised in a reasonable and lawful manner for the ad-
vancement of the interests of the medical profession and the public
generally. '4
9
Dr. Falcone, holding a Doctor of Osteopathy degree from an Ameri-
can college, received a Doctor of Medicine degree from the AMA-
approved University of Milan on the basis of only seven months atten-
dance plus credit for his previous studies. The medical society sought
to exclude him because his New Jersey license to practice medicine made
reference only to his osteopathy degree, and therefore, the society argued,
he was not actually licensed to practice medicine. Moreover, the society
had an "unwritten" rule requiring four years attendance at an AMA-
approved institution. The court held the first ground "unsound" because
his license authorized him to practice medicine and surgery without re-
46 Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 42, 52-53, 409 P.2d
934, 941-42, 48 Cal. Rptr. 710, 717-18 (1966).
47 For a more detailed discussion of the law in this area, see Comment, Judicial Control
of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 983 (1963).
4834 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
49 Id. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
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striction; it found application of the unwritten rule in the circumstances to
be "patently arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond the pale of the
law."5" Because of the society's important role in relation to both the
public and the medical profession, it could not act arbitrarily in admitting
members. The court therefore affirmed judgment requiring the society
to admit Dr. Falcone to full membership.
Similar principles have been applied to other cases dealing with the
admission of physicians to medical societies5 and hospital staffs. Two
California trial courts have held that a local real estate board which con-
trols multiple listing services and holds itself out to the public as a
regulator of the industry is "affected with a public interest" and may
not arbitrarily or unreasonably exclude licensed brokers from member-
ship." Similar limitations have been recognized as applicable to other
professional societies in cases wherein relief is nevertheless denied on
facts showing the exclusion was not arbitrary or unreasonable.-4
In determining whether good cause exists for exclusion of an appli-
cant, courts have considered the interests of both the applicant and the
public. The factors which courts deem relevant in determining whether
good cause exists indicate the "public service" nature of the institution
involved and the extent to which broad policies rather than individual
agreements may be used to determine the obligations of the parties. As
the Arizona supreme court said in a case involving admission to a medi-
cal society:
When determining whether "just cause" has been shown, the
court must consider whether the grounds for exclusion were (1) sup-
ported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably related to legiti-
mate professional purposes of the Society. The judicial process involved
in determining such a standard of reasonableness is essentially
one of balancing individual, group, and public interests: the right
of the individual to practice his profession without undue restric-
50 Id. at 598, 170 A.2d at 800.
51 Blende v. County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964); Kurk v. Medical
Soc'y, 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1965). See Note, Expulsion and Exclu-
sion from Hospital Practice and Organized Medical Societies, 15 RuTGERS L. REV. 327
(1961); Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE LJ. 937 (1954).
52 E.g., Rosner v. Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr.
551 (1962); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
53 Slaughter v. Board of Realtors, No. 334 342 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Calif.,
Mar. 29, 1965) ; Martin v. Board of Realtors, No. R-12694 (Super. Ct., Contra Costa County,
Calif., May 16, 1966).
s4 E.g., Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 808 (1965). Cf. Salter v. State Psychological Ass'n, 14 N.Y.2d 100, 198 N.E.2d 250
(1964). Various trade associations have also been subjected to judicial scrutiny with re-
spect to their admissions policies, but here courts have relied principally upon antitrust
statutes rather than common law. See Comment, supra note 47, at 1042.
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tion; the right of the public to have unrestricted choice of physi-
cians; and the justification for the Society's action. When examining
the justification for the exclusion, the court should consider several
factors: the social value of the Society's action; the appropriateness
of the society as a means of achieving the goal; and the reasonable-
ness of this particular action of the Society in relation to the goalP5
While cautioning against de novo review by the court of factual
matters involving the special competence of the society, the Arizona court
indicated that the applicant was entitled to consideration of his applica-
tion in "proceedings embodying the elements of due process.""
C. Protection of Organization Members Against Arbitrary Action
Protection of the individual against arbitrary action by organizations
once he is a member is an area of law which, again, the courts pioneered
in dealing with labor unions. While the relationship between unions and
their members is now regulated extensively by statute," the statutes
themselves are mainly codifications of leading common law decisions."
The pattern of these decisions represents a striking instance of the
manner in which courts in appropriate situations cut through traditional
contract principles to establish rights and obligations based on relation-
ship, or status.
The doctrine that a member is entitled to a fair hearing before he is
expelled, suspended, or otherwise disciplined by his union is one example.
The fair -hearing requirement was first established in early cases involving
religious and fraternal societies; 50 and, although the basis of the re-
quirement was not then discussed, it was later regarded as an implied
term of the "contract" which the organization's rules created between
the society and each member or among its members. 0 If the rules ex-
pressly dispensed with a hearing, however, or provided specifically for a
type of hearing not consistent with generally accepted notions of fairness,
the court could not read in such an implied term. Under strict contract
theory, the court would be powerless to interfere, since even invalidation
of obnoxious clauses as contrary to public policy would not produce an
affirmative fair hearing requirement.0'
55 Blende v. County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 245, 393 P.2d 926, 930 (1964).
56 Id.
57Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
There is also a considerable degree of state legislation in the field. See Aaron & Komaroff,
Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. REv. 425 (1949); Katz, Two
Decades of State Labor Legislation: 1937-1958, 25 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 109 (1957).
68 See J. GRODIn, supra note 35; Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,
72 H1Av. L. RzE., 609 (1959); Summers, The Role of Legislation in Internal Union Affairs,
i0 LAB. LJ. 155 (1959).9 E.g., innes v. Wylie, 174 Eng. Rep. 800 (Q.B. 1884) (cub).
60 Maclean v. Workers Union, [1929] 1 Ch. 602.
61 Id.
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Nevertheless, some courts at common law came to rule, in more recent
union cases, that a fair hearing was required whatever the union's rules
might say on the subject.62 The considerations behind such a require-
ment were expressed as follows by an English jurist:
[T] hese rules are more a contract in theory than a contract in fact.
In order for there to be a true contract, there must be the agreement
of parties freely made with full knowledge and without any feeling of
constraint .... In order that a person should be allowed to work at his
trade he had to sign a document agreeing to the rules. He had no option
but to sign ...
... [R] ules ... applied to a man in that state of mind ... are
not so much a contract, as we used to understand a contract, but they
are much more a legislative code laid down by some members of the
union to be imposed on all members of the union. They are more like
by-laws than a contract. 63
In other words, union bylaws, viewed as a contract, constitute a contract
of adhesion which is in reality a form of status, and courts confronted
with such a relationship will not permit the terms of the contract to
negate requirements which they consider clearly required by public policy
to protect the individual.
Judicial limitations on grounds for union discipline also reflect con-
cern with both the nature of the union as an institution and the union's
relationship to its individual members without regard to contractual re-
quirements. In general, courts have imposed upon unions, as a matter of
common law, limitations derived by analogy from constitutional principles
on the basis of a recognition, not always expressed, that a union is a
'cquasi-governmental" organization.64 Thus, in addition to requiring
due process in disciplinary proceedings, courts have prevented unions
from disciplining members who criticize union officers and policies, 5 or
who, as citizens, voice political opinions, 66 vote,67 or testify 6 contrary
6 2E.g., Bricklayers Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y.S. 855 (Sup. Ct. Eq. T. 1920), aff1'd
without opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y.S. 938 (1921).
63 Bonsor v. Musicians Union [1954] Ch. 479, 485 (Denning, LJ.).
64 See note 35 supra.
6 5 E.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958);
Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951). For analysis of the case re-
sults, showing protection of free expression both explicitly and implicitly, see Summers,
The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 33 TExAs L. REv. 603 (1955).
66 E.g., Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 813 (1961) (campaigning in favor of right-to-work law); Spayd v. Ringing Rock
Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921) (petitioning legislature in opposition to bill which
union supported).
67 Schneider v. Local 60, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905) (failure to obey union's instruc-
tions to vote as a member of a municipal board of examiners for particular candidate as
plumbing inspector).
6 8 Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929) (testifying before a
legislative committee that particular railroad equipment, favored by the union, had certain
disadvantages).
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to the wishes of the union. Unions may not make rules creating arbitrary
or unreasonable classes of membership, 9 and, in dealing with employers,
they must represent employees in the bargaining unit fairly, without dis-
crimination, 70 and perhaps with reasonable diligence.71 In effect, courts
have decreed that the union-member relationship, whatever the union's
rules, is to be treated in many respects like the relationship between a
government and a citizen.
Some of these principles, like the rules on admission to membership,
have been applied to other organizations which meet the "public service"
criteria. Presumably a member of any professional association in which
membership is important to the practice of his profession or trade is
entitled as a matter of law to a fair hearing in disciplinary proceedings
against him.72 Courts have imposed similar limitations on grounds for
disciplinary action. For example, in one California case, a physician was
expelled from his local medical society on the charge, among others, that
he had made "disparaging" comments about a fellow physician in a
report to the Industrial Accident Commission. Applying precedent from
labor union cases, the court held that interpretation of the Association's
bylaws to allow discipline for such conduct would contravene public
policy.7
3
The organizations referred to in this section are obviously diverse in
their economic and social settings, and each requires individual treat-
ment beyond the scope of this Article. But through the cases there runs
a common thread of thought, sometimes express, but most often implicit:
Each of these organizations plays a more or less definable role in our
society, and the legal content of the relationships involved is molded in
part by the nature of that role, by the appropriateness of particular
6 9 E.g., Cameron v. International Alliance etc. Employees, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 A. 692
(Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
70 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Here, however, the derivation of
the requirement is mainly statutory. For discussion, see Cox, The Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, 2 ViL. L. Rav. 151 (1957); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALa L.J. 1327 (1958).
71 See Glover v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 250 N.C. 35, 108 S.E.2d 78 (1959)
(common law suit based on negligence and agency). Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)
(no violation of duty of fair representation under federal law for union to refuse to process
grievance on basis of good faith, though erroneous, belief that grievance was without merit).
7 2 E.g., Swital v. Real Estate Comm'r, 116 Cal. App. 2d 677, 254 P.2d 587 (1953);
Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 Ill. App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963);
Berberian v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456 (1959). See Annot., Suspen-
sion or Expulsion from Professional Associations, 20 A.L.R.2d 531 (1951).
7 3 Bernstein v. Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (1956). The case
was remanded to the Association's trial council for determination of penalties on the re-
maining charges. Cf. State ex rel. Waring v. Medical Soc'y, 38 Ga. 608 (1869) (invalidating
discipline for providing bond to Negro); Manning v. Klein, 1 Pa. Super. 210 (1896)
(discipline for joining Sunday closing committee).
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actions and policies to that role, and by the reasonable expectations of
the public and the individuals affected. Such factors are neither abstractly
determined nor static in nature but are derived from examination of the
life and dynamics of the organization itself and from its own definition
of its role expressed through its rules and customs. The nature and extent
of judicial intervention should be, and normally is, limited by considera-
tions of organizational autonomy, through, for example, the doctrine re-
quiring exhaustion of internal remedies. 4 But judicial recognition of all
these considerations goes beyond reliance on traditional concepts of con-
tract and tort, and to that extent it represents a recognition and imposi-
tion of status concepts. We turn now to other relationships, less organiza-
tional in structure, which we believe generate similar concepts and judicial
attitudes.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
The relationship between the individual consumer and a business
enterprise is quite different in a number of significant respects from the
organizational relationships previously discussed. It is typically a sporadic
rather than a continuing relationship, and for that reason some of the
considerations which underlie status concepts are less applicable." For
the same reason, it is more susceptible of treatment within traditional
contract doctrine. Moreover, because it does not purport to be based on
any system of organizational authority, the governmental analogy is less
appropriate; judicially imposed protection of democratic participation,
for example, would not apply.
Yet, as we shall point out, the individual in this context finds himself
in the same position of inferior bargaining as that which obtains with
the powerful voluntary organization. In each case the service or product
to the individual is of significant and sometimes overwhelming impor-
tance; in each case one may view the institution as leading the public
to expect, and holding itself out to provide, goods or services of a particu-
lar nature or quality; in each case, too, the institution may be one which
has been traditionally or is currently regulated in other respects by
statute.
These factors either singly or collectively may occasion the judicial
74 See generally Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations,
69 YALE LJ. 369 (1956). As to the requirement in labor unions, see J. GRODIE, UNIoN
GOVERNSENT AnD THE LAW 35-52 (1961).
75Status concepts are typically associated with continuing relationships, in which the
participants are involved more extensively than they are in a single contractual transaction.
See P. Nonet, The Decline of Contract 41-59 (1964) (unpublished MA. thesis in University
Library, University of California, Berkeley).
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-imposition of obligations based upon relationship or status; here again,
as in the case of voluntary associations, courts at times insist that the
product or service conform to the reasonable expectations of the con-
suming public. We see in the business enterprise cases a sensitivity of
the courts to the plight of the individual in this highly organized and
complex society, a response which generates cases imposing obligations
that flow from the relationship of the parties.
In a variety of situations involving commercial enterprises the courts
have held that, regardless of limitations sought to be imposed by contract,
the product or service tendered to the public must conform to the reason-
able expectations of the persons to be served. The cases illustrate judicial
reluctance to enforce two types of contractual provisions: First, those
relieving the enterprise from liability for negligence in performing obliga-
tions based on its relationship with the other party; 76 and second, those
restricting the kind of obligation owed to the consuming public. 77
The first category of cases, nullifying contractual provisions which
would exonerate the vendor of goods or services from the consequences
of his own negligence, originated with attempts by public carriers to
limit their common law liability by private contract.7 1 With increasing
frequency, judicial techniques developed in response to such efforts to
limit liability have been applied in other areas. Instances of such applica-
tion occur in cases involving several relationships, for example, com-
mercial bailee and bailor,79 landlord and tenant,80 bank and deposi-
76 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (hospital-patient); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941) (landlord-
tenant); Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951) (bail-
ment).
77See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962) (insurance); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (manufacturer's liability).
78See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955). The carrier cannot
exempt itself from liability for negligence. E.g., United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 236, 239 (1952) ; Crane v. Railway Express Agency, 369 Ill. 110, 15 N.E.2d 866 (1938) ;
P. Garvan Inc. v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 210 Mass. 275, 96 N.E. 717 (1911). The
carrier can only limit its liability by contract if the shipper has the option of paying more
and receiving full protection. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921); Toyo
Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Willits & Co., 17 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1927); Hubbard v. Matson
Navigation Co., 34 Cal. App. 2d 475, 93 P.2d 846 (1939). See generally 6 S. W=mSTOn,
CoNmc RTs § 1751 C (rev. ed. 1938).
79 See Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951);
Baione v. Heavey, 103 Pa. Super. 529, 158 A. 181 (1932). See generally Annot., 175 AJL.R. 8,
120-35 (1948).
8OPapakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941) (exculpatory clause void).
See Arensberg, Limitation by Bailees and by Landlords of Liability for Negligent Acts, 51
Dicz. L. REv. 36, 37 (1946); Note, 15 U. PirT. L. Rav. 493 (1954). Exculpatory clauses in
leases have been held valid in most jurisdictions as not against public policy. E.g., Mills v.
Ruppert, 167 Cal. App. 2d 58, 333 P2d 818 (1959); Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens
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tor,8 ' hospital patient,"' utility and consumer,83 and others of a similar
character. 4 In Part A of this section we shall attempt to show how these
concepts apply in typical cases.
The second category of cases, unlike the first, does not involve at-
tempts to obtain anticipatory, relief from liability for negligent conduct.
Rather it involves purveyors of goods or services who seek by private
agreement to exact limitations upon liability for failure to perform con-
tractual duties. In nullifying such attempts, the courts have manifested a
growing tendency to require certain institutions, including insurers,8 5
banks, 0 and vendors of products that may cause injury to human life,8 7
to render the performance which the average member of the public might
reasonably expect of such enterprises. Part B includes a more detailed
analysis of illustrative cases.
In both categories of cases, courts now impose public obligations upon
private undertakings in order to protect the individual from the economi-
cally more powerful enterprises. In denying relief to the more powerful
party, a few courts have stressed the oppressive circumstances surround-
ing a particular agreement.8 Most courts, however, have placed greater
Bldgs., Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372 (1958). They are strictly construed, however,
and usually will not exempt the landlord for liability for "active" negligence. E.g., Barkett v.
Brucato, 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953); Simmons v. Pagones, 66 S.D. 296,
282 N.W. 257 (1938). See generally Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1044, 1054-56 (1952); Annot., 175
A.L.R. 8, 83-94 (1948).
81 See Frankini v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 12 Cal. App. 2d 298, 55
P.2d 232 (1936) ; Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948) ;
Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954). See generally Annot., 175
A.L.R. 8, 78-82 (1948).
8 2 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963); Note, 52 CAr=r. L. REv. 350, 352 (1964); Note, 11 U.CL.AL. Rxv. 639, 642 (1964);
Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 704 (1966).
83 Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945); Denver Consol.
Elec. Co. v. Lawrence, 31 Colo. 301, 73 P. 39 (1903); March v. Carbide & Carbon Chem.
Corp., 265 App. Div. 1064, 39 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1943); Bastian v. Keystone Gas Co., 27 App.
Div. 584, 50 N.Y.S. 537 (1898); Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 156 Misc. 562, 282 N.Y.S.
280 (Sup. Ct. 1935), rev'd on other ground, 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E.2d 434 (1936); Lone Star
Gas Co. v. Veal, 378 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964); Reeder v. Western Gas & Power
Co., 42 Wash. 2d 542, 256 P.2d 825 (1953). See generally Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 38-70
(1948).
8 4 See Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812
(1960) (drilling contract); Mohawk Drilling Co. v. McCullough Tool Co., 271 F.2d 627,
632-33 (10th Cir. 1959) (oil well servicing contract).85 See National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Colbrese, 368 F.2d 405, 411
(9th Cir. 1960); Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865
(D.D.C. 1964); Lowell v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 419 P.2d 180, 54 Cal. Rptr.
116 (1966); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966);
Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
80 See Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919).
87See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
8 8 See Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945), in which the
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emphasis upon the institutional relationship of the parties and upon their
respective roles in society; they have concluded that the status of the
purveyor of goods or services itself imposes an obligation to fulfill certain
public functions. Thus, if the institution or transaction exhibits one or
more of the "public service" criteria suggested in this Article, courts may
impose upon the performer the obligation to render such performance as
fulfills the reasonable expectation of the other party. In reaching this re-
sult, courts sometimes expressly recognize these "public service" factors;
more often they employ orthodox terminology. Courts may articulate the
obligation, for example, in terms of a common law relationship like bail-
ment. 9 They may speak of the intent of the parties, imposing an obliga-
tion in the course of interpreting a contract °0 Finally, they may describe
the obligation in the vague language of "public policy"'" or in the de-
scriptive terms of more recently developed doctrines, such as enterprise
liability9 In all these cases, allusions to the actual relationship of the
parties, to circumstances surrounding the transaction, and to the changing
role of the institution involved, indicate that courts are extending old
doctrines and terminology to impose obligations based on relationships
characteristic of a new, industrial society.
A. Limitations on Liability for Negligence
Courts refuse to enforce contract provisions exempting certain enter-
prises from liability for negligence. Professional bailees, landlords, banks
defendant gas company knew of a gas leak in the plaintiff's home and took no steps to
repair it or to warn the plaintiff, and Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 377,
248 P. 947, 953 (1926), in which an exculpatory clause in a stop-payment notice was held
void as to a plaintiff who could not read English. Judicial negation of private bargains
through the developing doctrine of the unconscionable contract is analogous to the imposi-
tion of public obligations upon private undertakings. Writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Skelly Wright refused to enforce a printed form contract
for the installment purchase of furniture which provided in a "rather obscure provision"
that "the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item was secured by the right to
repossess all the items previously purchased by the same purchaser, and each new item
purchased automatically became subject to a security interest arising out of the previous
dealings." Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir.
1965). The court held the contract "unconscionable" because it posed "an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are un-
reasonably favorable to the other party." Id. at 449. The analogy of this approach to that
developed in this Article is demonstrated by the court's reliance upon the "gross inequality
of bargaining power," the possible lack of opportunity "to understand the terms of the
contract" because of the "maze of fine print," id., and the frequent references to Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Id. at 448 n.2, 449 n.7, 450 n.12.
See also Collins, Contracts, 1965 AwNuAL Suavy or A mc.s LAw 326-330.
89 Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951).
90 Barkett v. Brucato, 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953).
9 1 Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 64 A.2d 51 (1949).
92 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
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and hospitals may thus be judicially required to meet certain standards
of conduct whatever their contractual relations with the public.
1. Bailor-Bailee Relationship
When dealing with owners and operators of parking lots, parcel check-
rooms, garages and warehouses, many courts invoke traditional rules of
bailment to impose minimum obligations on the performance of such
undertakings. Exculpatory clauses in contracts involving these enter-
prises are struck down as inconsistent with the legal relationship of
bailor and bailee.93 Despite judicial reliance on mechanical rules of bail-
ment and on language of "public policy," '94 such decisions rest on a recog-
nition of the public service nature of these enterprises and on insistence
that the service conform to that which the public may reasonably expect.
In Agricultural Insurance Company v. Constantine,95 for example, the
court used bailment language to emphasize the obligations arising from
a parking lot owner's relationship with his customers. Although the case
apparently rested on the theory that contracts limiting "liability for
negligence" in parking lot tickets are "generally regarded as against
public policy,"96 the court explained that the ticket was a mere "token
for the identification of the bailed property."9 Therefore, its printed
provisions could in no way alter customary bailment relationships without
clear assent by the bailor, who otherwise expects the bailee to carry out
his obligation of due care. Although the court spoke both of "public
policy" and of the bailment contract, it emphasized the bailor's expecta-
tion of a certain quality of performance by the bailee. 98
Cases like Constantine express status obligations in traditional bail-
ment language, but judicial use of "public policy" terminology serves to
adapt the bailor-bailee relationship to modern circumstances. "The trend
of modern authorities holds that such an effort on the part of a bailee
93 See, e.g., Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 292, 64 A.2d 51, 53-54 (1949); Miller's
Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 23-24, 65 S.E.2d 341, 343-44 (1951); Agricul-
tural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 282, 58 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1944); Wendt v.
Sley System Garages, Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 224, 188 A. 624 (1936). See generally Annot., 175
A.L.R. 8, 110-44 (1948).
9 4 See, e.g., Michigan Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Canadian Northern Ry., 58 F. Supp.
326, 329 (1944), aff'd, 152 F.2d 292 (1945); Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 293, 64
A.2d 51, 54 (1949); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 283, 58 N.E.2d
658, 663 (1944); England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 571, 271 P. 532,
536 (1928). In Malone v. Santora, supra, the court found an exculpatory provision in a
parking lot ticket "'revolting to the moral sense, and contrary alike to the salutary princi-
ples of law and a sound public policy,"' but did not particularize upon these observations.
Id. at 293, 64 A.2d at 54, quoting Welch v. Boston & A.R.R., 41 Conn. 333, 342 (1874).
95 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658 (1944).
96Id. at 283, 58 N.E.2d at 663.
97 Id. at 280, 58 N.E.2d at 661.
98 See id. at 281-82, 58 N.E.2d at 662.
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to exempt himself from negligence is contrary to public policy. 099 Thus,
an old common law relationship receives new content and purpose in re-
sponse to modem circumstances surrounding the bailment transaction.
In Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Association v. Parker,100 another
parking lot case, the court openly recognized the impact of today's in-
tegrated society on the bailment relationship. Acknowledging the bailee's
right expressly to limit his own liability when the parties possess
equal bargaining power and when the contract is consistent with public
policy, the court discussed the actual role of the modern parking lot. "The
complexity of today's commercial relations and the constantly increasing
number of automobiles render the question of parking a matter of public
concern .. .. no Parking lot operators are "professional bailees" who
"hold themselves out to the public as being possessed of convenient means
and special facilities to furnish the service offered for a price. They deal
with the public on a uniform basis and at the same time impose or seek
to impose predetermined conditions which rob the customer of any
equality of bargaining power. 10 2 Such characteristics are equally applic-
able to "garages, parcel check rooms, and warehouses."'1 3 In such cir-
cumstances, the bailee may not contract against his own negligence.
Although the Miller's Mutual court used bailment language, it em-
phasized the "duties of public service" of a "public service corpora-
tion. °104 It relied not only on traditional obligations of the bailor-bailee
relationship, but on such obligations examined in the light of the ex-
pectations and relative bargaining power of the parties.
2. Landlord-Tenant Relationship
Courts may derive similar obligations from the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. Whatever the economic situation as to land may have been in
the less congested cities of the nineteenth century, twentieth century
developments in urban areas in large measure have vested superior bar-
gaining power in the landlord. 0 5 As one Illinois court has observed, for
example, "[I]n large cities, due to such organizations as real estate
9 9 England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 571, 271 P. 532, 536 (1928).
100 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951).
101Id. at 24, 65 S.E.2d at 344.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 23, 65 S.E.2d at 344.
104 Id. at 22, 65 SE.2d at 342.
10 5 When houses are scarce and landlords are grasping, Blackstone's proposition that
the public good is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of
every individual's private rights is not the popular view. A crowded, urban, industrial
community looks to society for protection against predatory individuals, natural or
artificial, and resents doctrines that protect these individuals against society for fear
society will oppress them.
R. PouND, Tm SPimrr oF THE Co arox LAW 102-03 (1921). The change in bargaining power
of landlord and tenant has resulted in the enactment of statutes making void exculpatory
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boards, managers' associations and large renting agencies, there has de-
veloped the use of a lease which is very generally uniform in its terms."' 6
As in the bailment cases, courts have recognized such changed circum-
stances even while doing so through traditional legal terminology.
In refusing to enforce exculpatory lease provisions exonerating land-
lords from negligence, courts often speak of the intent of the parties.10 7
As in bailment cases, however, such general language may represent the
court's imposition of obligations based on the public service nature of the
landlord-tenant relationship.
In Barkett v. Brucato,0 s for example, the court held that a general
waiver clause in a lease should not be interpreted to cover affirmative
negligence by the landlord, since the parties "could not have intended to
provide that the landlord should not be liable for acts amounting to
active and affirmative negligence."' 0 9 The court noted a "marked tendency
in recent cases" so to interpret exculpatory clauses;" 0 the courts thus,
through traditional language of contract interpretation, express a response
to changes in the actual landlord-tenant relationship.
In Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Buildings, Incorporated,"'
the court discussed at length the factual circumstances surrounding the
landlord-tenant relationship, emphasizing the landlord's superior bargain-
ing power and widespread use of standard leases. 12 It indicated that
although execution of one exculpatory clause may not be "a matter of
public concern, . . . the execution of numerous exculpatory clauses . . .
made the leases a matter of social relationship."-" The court explained
that the reasons for excluding exculpatory clauses in the "semi-public
relationship" between common carriers and passengers and shippers also
apply to the landlord-tenant relationship, because both are matters of
public interest." 4
The importance of the service, the unequal bargaining power of the
clauses in leases. MAss. GmT. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15 (1958); N.Y. RAL PROp. LAW § 234
(McKinney 1945), now N.Y. GEN. OBSGATiONS LAW § 5-321 (McKinney N.Y. Real Prop.
Supp. 1967). See Rehberg, Exculpatory Clauses in Leases, 15 GA. BJ. 389, 396-400 (1953).
1o Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 25-26, 155
N.E.2d 372, 384 (1958).
10 7 See the interesting discussion of Presiding justice Peters, Barkett v. Brucato, 122
Cal. App. 2d 264, 278, 264 P.2d 978, 988 (1953); Drescher Rothberg Co. v. Landeker, 140
N.Y.S. 1025 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1913).
108 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953).
109 Id. at 278, 264 P.2d at 988.
110 Id
11120 ll. App. 2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372 (1958). Although the case upheld the validity
of an exculpatory clause on the basis of precedent, the whole opinion is an argument for
refusing to enforce such clauses. See id. at 30-32, 155 N.E.2d at 386-87.
112 Id. at 25-26, 155 NY..2d at 384.
113Id. at 30-31, 155 N.E.2d at 386.
4Id. at 26-27, 155 N.E2d at 384-85.
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parties, and the fact that housing is subject to regulation by the state
all indicate that the landlord-tenant relationship is one "affected with
a public interest."" 5 Legislation in some states outlawing exculpatory
clauses in leases indicates a general recognition of the public's interest
in the relationship." 6
3. Banks and Hospitals
Some cases present neither an historical common law relationship,
like a bailment, nor an encompassing contractual relationship, like a
lease, as a basis for imposing liability. In such situations courts must
rely more overtly on the expectations arising from the actual relationship
between the parties. When banks and hospitals attempt to limit their own
liability for negligence, courts, relying upon the modern roles of such
institutions, sometimes impose obligations based on the public's reason-
able expectations of the services to be rendered."
7
Although some decisions hold otherwise,' 8 a great number of courts
follow the rule that banks cannot exculpate themselves from negligence
for paying a stopped check by so providing in a stop-payment notice." 0
Banks bear a duty to exercise due care in making payment from the ac-
count; courts will hold them liable for failure to comply with it.120 One
115 "Inns are public callings and were so considered even at early common law. There
is some support for the view that even the renting of house is a business affected with a
public interest. At least, courts have held that in times of emergency, the business of renting
houses is sufficiently affected with a public interest to justify regulations concerning rents."
F. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BusINEss ArEECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTMEST 50 (1940).
116 See authorities cited note 105 supra.
117 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 444-47,
32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36-39 (1963); Hiroshina v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 377, 248
P. 947, 953 (1926).
118 Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (1932); Tremont
Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782; Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y.
152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929). See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1155, 1156 (1948). See also Irish & Swartz
Stores v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 Ore. 362, 349 P.2d 814 (1960).
119 Grisinger v. Golden State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268 P. 425 (1928); Hiroshima
v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926); Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co.,
149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 101
A.2d 910 (1954). Such agreements may be held unenforceable for failure of consideration.
Commercial Bank v. Hall, 266 Ala. 57, 94 So. 2d 198 (1957); Calamita v. Tradesmen's
Nat'1 Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949); Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1951), aff'd 9 N.J. 607, 89 A.2d
242 (1952). Using analogous reasoning, courts have held that banks cannot exculpate them-
selves from negligence by a provision in a passbook stating that its possession is sufficient
evidence of ownership to make payment to any person producing it. E.g., Chase v. Water-
bury Say. Bank, 77 Conn. 295, 59 A. 37 (1904); Ladd v. Augusta Say. Bank, 96 Me. 510,
52 A. 1012 (1902); Bulakowski v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y, 270 Pa. 538, 113 A. 553
(1921).
120E.g., Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926); Chase v.
Waterbury Say. Bank, 77 Conn. 295, 59 A. 37 (1904); Ladd v. Augusta Say. Bank, 96 Me.
510, 52 A. 1012 (1902).
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may view this duty as arising from a bank's relationship with its cus-
tomers. As one court observed:
[T] he banking public, as well as the particular individual who may be
concerned in the giving of any stop notice, is interested in seeing that
the bank is held accountable for the ordinary and regular performance
of its duties .... It may also be added that the testimony shows the
parties in this case were not contracting upon an equal basis.121
Finally, courts may treat hospitals as public service institutions
which cannot avoid liability for negligence through exculpatory clauses.
In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,122 the California
supreme court held invalid the provision in a hospital's agreement con-
ditioning the patient's admission on his release of the hospital from any
liability for future negligence. Although the court held that the agree-
ment violated a statutory provision forbidding exemption from negli-
gence, 123 the opinion rested on a ground broader than statutory interpre-
tation. Holding the contract to be "affected with a public interest, m1 24 the
court set out the characteristics of such an agreement:
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of
practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the
public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain
established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the service,
in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpa-
tion possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a
purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person
or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller,
subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.125
Although courts rely on these characteristics in defining an enterprise
as a public service institution, Tunkl is unique in containing all such fac-
tors. As the opinion indicated, however, a transaction which exhibits
"some or all" of the characteristics is affected with a public interest. 26
The cases in this Article which treat enterprises or transactions as
affected with a public interest involve at least one of the factors enumer-
ated in Tunkl.
121 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 377, 248 P. 947, 953 (1926).
122 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
123 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1954).
124 60 Cal. 2d at 98, 383 P.2d at 444, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
125Id. at 98-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
1261Id. at 98, 383 P.2d at 445, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (emphasis added).
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In Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,27 the
Illinois supreme court held that a hospital could not limit its liability
for alleged negligence to the amount of its liability insurance. Such a
limitation, based on an assertion of charitable immunity, would permit
hospitals "to determine whether or not they will be liable for their torts
and the amount of that liability, if any."' 28 This arbitrary choice by the
hospital is inconsistent with its modern relationship with the public:
The conception that a hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but under-
takes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsi-
bility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner
of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities
for treatment.... Certainly, the person who avails himself of 'hospital
facilities' expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that
its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility. 20
Each hospital must assume its expected obligation toward its patients and
cannot predetermine for itself the extent of its responsibility by anticipa-
tory exculpatory provisions.
B. Limitations on Risks Undertaken
As we have explained, when a party to a transaction "affected with a
public interest" attempts contractually to deny or limit his own liability
for negligence, in defiance of the reasonable expectations of the weaker
party to the contract, courts may impose obligations by refusing to en-
force such clauses.3 0 Although they may invoke the language of common
law relationships such as bailment, of contract interpretation, or of
"public policy," the obligation they impose is based in each case on the
relationship between the parties rather than on contract.
In a second group of cases, the purveyor of goods or services may
try to limit by contract not his liability for negligence, but the kind of
obligation he owes the public. The insurer, the bank, or the manufacturer
may attempt to shift some of his business risks to the consumer. Again,
many courts refuse to enforce such contract provisions and instead define
the scope of the obligation in terms of the parties' reasonable expecta-
tions,' 8 ' thus adopting the approach suggested by Professor Kessler and
i2733 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E2d 253 (1965).
12 8 Id. at 337, 211 N.E.2d at 260.
'
2 9 Id. at 332, 211 NY..2d at 257, quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143
N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957) (emphasis added). See also Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 200 Misc.
1104, 107 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1951), appeal dismissed, 306 N.Y. 669, 116 N.E.2d 498
(1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 NE.2d 836 (1954).
180 See text accompanying notes 93-129 supra.
181 See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966)
(insurer); Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919)
(bank); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (manu.
facturer).
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other commentators for adhesion contracts. 32
1. Insurance Companies
The concept that a contract is to be interpreted in the light of the
parties' reasonable expectations lies deep in contract law.133 Basically
courts have long looked to the language of the contract to find the mean-
ing which the parties reasonably expected from the use of the words.
Applying the concept somewhat differently, courts may derive the reason-
able expectations of the parties from their relationship or status rather
than from the consensual transaction itself. When the public service
enterprise is an insurance company dealing with an insurance purchaser
who is obviously the weaker party to the transaction, many courts in
determining contractual obligations have examined the reasonable ex-
pectation of the average insured.134 Thus, courts have stricken from in-
surance contracts unclear, unexpected, inconspicuous, or unconscionable
limitations of liability which would frustrate the reasonable expectations
of the insured.35 Courts have also refused to enforce clauses which
would negate the principal protection which the insured would reasonably
expect.3 6
In Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, 137 the in-
132 "In dealing with standardized contracts courts have to determine what the weaker
contracting party could legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's
'calling' and to what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based
on the typical life situation." Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Free-
dom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629, 637 (1943). See also Isaacs, The Standardizing of
Contracts, 27 YALE L.J 34, 38 (1917); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 700,
704 (1939). For further discussions of the adhesion contract, see authorities cited in Note,
Insurance: The Meaning of the Contract in Light of the Insured's Reasonable Expectations,
2 LnicorM L. Rlv. 158 n.7 (1967).
1 33 See Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 CoLum. L.
REv. 833, 858 (1964); Comment, Contracts of Adhesion under California Law, 1 U. SANr
FRNscisco L. REv. 306 (1967).
134 Patterson, supra note 133, at 858; see Kessler, supra note 132, at 637; Patterson,
supra note 133, at 858. Significantly, in 1921 Dean Pound said:
Iln the purely judicial development of our law we have taken the law of in-
surance practically out of the category of contract, and we have established that
the duties of public service companies are not contractual, as the nineteenth-century
sought to make them, but are instead relational; they do not flow from agreements
which the public servant may make as he chooses, they flow from the calling in
which he has engaged and his consequent relation to the public.
R. PoND, THE SPIRIT O THE COmoN LAW 29 (1921).
135 See, e.g., Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865, 868
(1964) ; Lowell v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 419 P.2d 180, 54 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1966);
Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
136 E.g., Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 626, 635, 107 P.2d 252, 256
(1940). See also Kessler, supra note 132, at 635, 637.
13758 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
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sured purchased from an airport vending machine an insurance policy
covering a contemplated airplane trip. A scheduled airliner was cancelled
for one leg of the trip, and the nonscheduled aircraft which was sub-
stituted for it crashed, killing the insured. The California supreme court
held that a clause in the insurance policy excluding coverage for travel on
nonscheduled airlines was too ambiguous to be enforced. Ostensibly
interpreting an ambiguous clause, the court took into account both the
unequal bargaining power of the parties and the reasonable expectation
of the public: Through use of a vending machine, "[T]he insurer had
adopted a means of selling policies which makes bargaining totally im-
possible,"'38 and if the insurer "deals with the public upon a mass basis,
the notice of noncoverage of the policy, in a situation in which the public
may reasonably expect coverage, must be conspicuous, plain and clear."'18
In Wernecke v. Pacific Fidelity Life Insurance Company'4" insurance
coverage was similarly defined on the basis of "what the ordinary layman
might reasonably expect under the circumstances."'4 The insured applied
for insurance, paid an amount equal to the first premium, and received
a receipt. The application and receipt came to the insurance company's
home office, which determined, subsequent to the insured's intervening
death in an automobile accident, that under company rules the insured
was not insurable. The court stated:
To the ordinary layman, payment of an insurance premium constitutes
payment for insurance protection, and when paid under circumstances
such as in the instant case presupposes immediate commencement of
protection although subject to termination by the insurance company
in the event it is not satisfied with his insurability.142
Where the provisions of the receipt were contradictory, the layman's
expectations should be fulfilled.
Steven and Wernecke rest in part upon judicial scrutiny of the lan-
guage of the policy and the finding that the limitations of coverage were
ambiguous or "esoteric." In this respect these courts did not depart from
the many cases that undertake a painstaking analysis of policy provisions
and, upon finding some ambiguity in them, read the clauses, in the time-
honored manner, against the insurance company. 43 But Steven and
138 Id. at 883, 377 P.2d at 297, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
139Id. at 878, 377 P2d at 294, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182. See also Raulet v. Northwestern
Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 P. 292 (1910).
140 238 Cal. App. 2d 884, 48 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1965).
141 Id. at 887, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
142 Id.
'4s See, e.g., Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 224, 107 P. 292, 296
(1910). See Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fiindamental Breach, 50 VA.
L. Rav. 1178, 1180 (1964).
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Wernecke relied, too, upon the proposition that the insurer could not
win noncoverage by means of an inexplicit clause in the face of a reason-
ably expected coverage.
The reasonable expectation doctrine in insurance cases has advanced
beyond excluding ambiguous limiting provisions. Some decisions have
relied heavily upon the proposition that the insurer cannot enforce a
provision which seeks to nullify the very essence of the insurance contract
-the reasonably-to-be-expected protection. This proposition was sug-
gested in an action by an insured against an insurer for failure to defend
an action filed against him for alleged assault. In Gray v. Zurick Insur-
ance Company,'44 the insurer contended that an exclusionary clause of
the policy excused the defense of an action in which the plaintiff alleged
that the insured intentionally caused the bodily injury. But the court
pointed out that the designation of the policy as a "comprehensive per-
sonal liability" contract in itself connoted general protection for alleged
bodily injury caused by the insured.'45 The insurer had promised both to
pay all sums that the insured became legally obligated to pay for bodily
injury and to defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury,
even if the allegations of the complaint were false or fraudulent. Such
promises, without further clarification, would lead the insured reasonably
to expect the insurer to defend him against suits seeking damages for
bodily injury, whether the alleged cause was intentional or inadvertent.
The California supreme court said:
In summary, the individual consumer in the highly organized and
integrated society of today must necessarily rely upon institutions
devoted to the public service to perform the basic functions which
they undertake. At the same time the consumer does not occupy a
sufficiently strong economic position to bargain with such institutions
as to specific clauses of their contracts of performance, and, in any
event, piecemeal negotiation would sacrifice the advantage of uni-
formity. Hence the courts in the field of insurance contracts have
tended to require that the insurer render the basic insurance protec-
tion which it has held out to the insured. This obligation becomes
especially manifest in the case in which the insurer has attempted to
limit the principal coverage by an unclear exclusionary clause. We
test the alleged limitation in the light of the insured's reasonable ex-
pectation of coverage; that test compels the indicated outcome of the
present litigation. 46
In Lagomarsino v. San Jose Abstract and Title Insurance Company, 47
144 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), noted in 55 Calif. L. Rev.
1104 (1967) and 2 Lmxcol. L. Rav. 157 (1967) and 14 U.CLA. L. REV. 1328 (1967).
45Id. at 272, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
"4GId. at 280, 419 P.2d at 179, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
147 178 Cal. App. 2d 455, 3 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1960).
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a California court of appeal interpreted a title insurance policy's cover-
age in terms of the relationship between insurer and insured and in
light of the latter's reasonable expectation of protection. The policy
ambiguously described the triangular piece of insured property by refer-
ence both to a railroad right of way and to iron pipes set in the ground.
The insurer sought to avoid the risk by asserting that the right of way
prevailed over courses and distances and therefore that title was guaran-
teed only to the smaller area of land. The court refused to allow the
insurer to "place a selective construction upon the description, or an
ambiguity in it, which will defeat its own obligation.' 48 The court de-
fined the title company's obligation to "give the insured the protection
which he reasonably had a right to expect" as arising from "the function
it performs and the relationship to the insured which it assumes."' 40
2. Banks
Courts have held that banks, as public service institutions, cannot
enforce contractual provisions that would limit liability in a manner not
expected by, and not clearly communicated to, the depositor.150
In Los Angeles Investment Company v. Home Savings Bank,'"' for
example, an "Agreement with Depositor," printed in the passbook, in-
cluded a provision that after ten days the depositor could not question
the genuineness of indorsements. The plaintiff depositor sued to recover
the amount of checks drawn by the plaintiff upon the deposit account
and paid by the defendant bank on forged indorsements. Holding that the
Caverage man" would not trouble to read such a provision and that it
materially changed the "usual obligation" of the bank, the court refused
to enforce it without evidence of the depositor's consent. The court said:
This statement is not signed by the plaintiff, nor is there any showing
that it was called to the plaintiff's attention or wittingly agreed to by
it. It is just the character of thing that the average man would not
148 Id. at 463-64, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
149 Id. at 464, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 85, quoting Coast Mut. Bldg. Loan Ass'n v. Security
Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 14 Cal. App. 2d 225, 229, 57 P.2d 1392, 1393 (1936). To the same
effect see the opinion of Mr. justice Fleming in Murray v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 250 A.C.A.
313, 316, 58 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1967), stating as follows:
In defense, the title company initially relies on certain exclusions purporting to re-
strict its coverage to the specific lot described in the policy and to disclaim responsi-
bility for defects in the title to adjoining streets, and the like. We are not im-
pressed with this defense, and we have no hesitancy in finding the title company's
blanket exclusions from the coverage of its policy wholly inconsistent with the pro-
tection which the face of the policy purports to offer. (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of New York, 58 Cal. 2d 862, 879-83 [27 Cal. Rptr 172, 377 P.2d 284).)
50
oSee Wells v. Black, 117 Cal. 157, 48 P. 1090 (1897); Ackenhausen v. People's Say.
Bank, 110 Mich. 175, 68 N.W. 118 (1896). See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 708 (1958).
151180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919).
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trouble to read, or reading would fail to appreciate the significance of
the inclusion in it of "indorsements," and the fact that it very ma-
terially changed the usual obligation of a bank to its depositors. There
is no reason, so far as we know, why a depositor may not make such
an agreement if he deliberately chooses to do so, unreasonable as it is.
But it is evident that the statement comes in the category of "traps
for the unwary," and before such statement can be given effect as a
contract binding upon the depositor and changing in a substantial
particular the relation which presumably he thought he was entering
into, it must appear affirmatively that he consented and agreed to it.
152
Frankini v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association
is another such case. 1 13 There the defendant bank contended that the
plaintiff depositor had waived his right to recover because of failure to
object to the bank statements or to claim his alleged credit within the
ten-day period required by a provision in an agreement entitled "Authori-
zation to Mail Statements and Vouchers." Although the plaintiff had
signed the authorization, the court held it did not frustrate his recovery
because it had not been called to his attention; "the instrument was pre-
sented to him as a mere written request for monthly statements . . .
[and] was retained by the bank."' 54
It should be noted that, in cases involving insurance companies and
banks, courts have used the reasonable expectation doctrine in two
ways: They have rejected unclear, unexpected, inconspicuous, and un-
conscionable provisions that would limit the institution's liability; 5 5 and
they have refused to enforce clauses which negate the principal or essen-
tial protection which the individual who deals with the institution would
reasonably expect.156 Perhaps the second application is the more im-
portant. It reaches to the heart of the concept of the public service insti-
tution in its insistence that the institution, as a public functionary,
perform the basic undertaking that it holds itself out as doing. 57 The
152 Id. at 613, 182 P. at 298.
153 12 Cal. App. 2d 298, 55 P.2d 232 (1936).
154 Id. at 303, 55 P.2d at 234.
25 See text accompanying notes 137-43 supra.
15 See text accompanying notes 144-54 supra.
157 The concept that the insurer undertakes a fundamental duty to the insured which
the courts generally should effectuate finds expression in Glickman v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 16 Cal. 2d 626, 634-35, 107 P.2d 252, 256 (1940):
Contracts of insurance should be viewed in the light of their general objects and
purposes, including the legitimate conditions prescribed by the insurer (Raulet v.
Northwestern etc. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213 [107 P. 292]). In general, the object
and purpose of insurance is to indemnify the insured in case of loss, and ordinarily
such indemnity should be effectuated rather than defeated .... Policies of insurance
create reciprocal rights and obligations . ... An insured is entitled to the protec-
tion which he buys and for which he pays substantial premiums.
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depositor expects the bank to perform its "usual obligations"; courts
will not enforce the bank's attempt to avoid such responsibility. The in-
surer is supposed to insure; the public expects it to do so, and many
courts insist that it do so, despite the nicety of sophisticated phrases of
limitation or exclusion. The present quest for the uncertain clause,
pursued by many courts, may end in the formulation of the doctrine that
the insurer cannot by the most certain and understandable language
negate the essence of his bargain.
As Professor Meyer has suggested, 58 the recent English doctrine of
"fundamental breach" represents an analogous approach. The rule is
designed to invalidate attempted disclaimers by which the promisor would
invalidate that obligation which the courts consider the essence of the
transaction.159 The English approach would replace judicial attempts to
find ambiguous or unconscionable terms with a straightforward annulment
of clauses inconsistent with the basic obligations of the contract. "Per-
haps 'fundamental obligation' would better express the doctrine's notion
of an irreducible core duty, a duty which arises from the relationship
created by the contract rather than from the specific terms.1100 It may be
noted that the "core duty" coincides with that performance by the public
service enterprise which the public would reasonably expect.
3. Manufacturers and Distributors
Courts have come to regard the relationship between a purveyor of
goods and a consumer as an appropriate one for the imposition of duties
not arising from contract. 61 The manufacturer or distributor normally
158 Meyer, supra note 143, at 1188.
159 One English court stated: "[E]xempting clauses are nowadays all held to be sub-
ject to the overriding proviso that they only avail to exempt a party when he is carrying
out his contract, not when he is deviating from it or is guilty of a breach which goes to the
root of it." J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 461, 465 (CA.) (emphasis
added). In a 1966 case, however, the House of Lords abandoned the doctrine of fundamental
breach as a rule of law. Suisse Atlantique Socid6t6 d'Armement Maritime SA. v. N.V. Rotter-
damsche Kolen Centrale, [1966] 2 W.L.R. 944. Although they did so in dictum, the "mem-
bers of the House were, nevertheless, unanimous that there was no substantive doctrine of
fundamental breach and that the question whether an exception clause was applicable where
there had been a fundamental breach was one of the true construction of the contract."
Coote, The Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach, 40 Ausm. L.J. 336, 343 (1967). See Tiley,
Fundamental Breach, 110 SoL. J. 730 (1966).
160 Meyer, supra note 143, at 1188.
1 61 See generally Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STA. L. Rlv.
1077, 1086-87 (1965) ; Posel, Sales and Sales Financing, 16 RxomiRs L. REv. 329, 331 (1962) ;
Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contracts Between the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 Ruruxas L. REv. 692, 293-94 (1965); Note,
Disclaimer Clauses in Standardized Warranties: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 46
Coar-M L.Q. 608 (1961); Comment, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HAv.
L. REv. 318, 322-23, 325 (1963).
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exerts greater bargaining power than does the consumer, and he under-
takes a service of importance to the public in which the public must rely on
the seller for the quality of the product. Courts refuse to enforce the
vendor's disclaimer, and tend to protect the individual, the weak bar-
gainer, against the economically more powerful vendor.1 2
The terminology used by courts to impose obligations on a vendor
may be that of implied warranty1 3 or of strict liability in tort.1 4 The im-
portant element for the courts, however, is recognition of the impact of
modern commercial conditions on the relationship of buyer and seller.
As one court put it, "It must be said that in the present-day marketing
milieu, treatment of the manufacturer's liability to ultimate purchasers
or consumers in terms of implied warranty is simply using a convenient
legal device or formalism to accomplish the purpose.7 65
Most of the elements of a public service enterprise were recognized
by the court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Incorporated,' which
held void as a matter of law Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of an implied
warranty of merchantability. The court pointed out that to many people
an automobile is a necessity,167 that automobile manufacturers through
massive advertising hold themselves out as providing products of a
certain quality,0 8 that the consumer is in an inferior bargaining position,
and that he is often faced with a standardized contract.' 9 The court
further noted that legislation regulating various aspects of the manufac-
ture and use of automobiles indicates the public importance of the in-
dustry. 70 The court expressly analogized the automobile industry to
such "semi-public services" as common carriers, checkrooms, and park-
ing lots.171 Given these circumstances, "[W]hen a manufacturer puts a
new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the
public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such
accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser.1 -
In the leading case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Incorpo-
162See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
163 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
164 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
165 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965).
16632 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
167 Id. at 386, 161 A.2d at 85.
168 Id. at 385, 161 A.2d at 84.
169 Id. at 390, 161 A.2d at 87.
170 Id. at 387, 161 A.2d at 85.
171 Id. at 396-99, 161 A.2d at 91-92.
172 Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
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rated 7 3 the California supreme court based the manufacturer's liability
for injuries caused by a defective power tool on strict liability in tort
rather than an implied warranty. Implicitly recognizing the importance
to the public of the manufacturing enterprise, the court, speaking through
Justice Traynor, referred to strict liability's origin in "the case of un-
wholesome food products" and noted that "such liability has now been
extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater
hazards if defective."'74 The court went on to observe that "[T]he recog-
nition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law
[citing cases] and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the
scope of its own responsibility for defective products [citing cases] make
clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract war-
ranties but by strict liability in tort."' 75 The obligation rests on the
manufacturer-consumer relationship alone: "Implicit in the machine's
presence on the market, . . . was a representation that it would safely
do the jobs for which it was built."176
Observations of commentators and cases indicate that the doctrine
of strict liability stems in major part from the belief that the ordinary
consumer has the right to expect that the product will safely perform
the operation which it undertakes and that the law should impose the
obligation to do so. 17 Strict liability reflects the fact that the "seller, by
marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming
public who may be injured by it.' 178 The factors discussed in Henningsen
are important only as forming the total context of the manufacturer-
consumer relationship; the manufacturer's duty is not conditioned upon
advertising to promote sales, but arises from "the mere presence of the
product on the market."'7 9
Strict liability extends beyond the manufacturer to the distributor
or the merchandiser in the marketing chain whom the consumer would
reasonably expect to bear the loss.8 0 The manufacturer-assembler does
17359 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
174 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
175Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
176 Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
177See, e.g., Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1964); Ford
Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 273-74 (5th Cir. 1963); Southland Milling Co. v. Vege
Fat, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 482, 485-86 (E.D. 1I1. 1965); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F.
Supp. 427, 429, 431 (ND. Ind. 1965); commentators cited in Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co.,
supra at 920-21; commentators cited supra note 161.1 78 RIsTAT-~rx (SEcoND) or ToRTs § 402A, comment c (1965).
179 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965). See
Rapson, supra note 161.
18OVandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 296, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964).
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not escape strict liability because damage resulted from a defect in a
mechanical part incorporated in the completed product.'' Similarly, the
manufacturer may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the
independent supplier. Thus, in Ford Motor Company v. Matkis'82 the
court sustained the car owner's action for damages for personal and
property loss caused by a defective dimmer switch which was manufac-
tured by an independent supplier and which the defendant assembler
placed in the car. The court held that the consumer would reasonably
expect the manufacturer-assembler to stand behind his product. The
court stated: "The purchaser of a new automobile is led by the manu-
facturer-assembler to think that the car is a quality product. In effect,
the purchaser does not distinguish between the assembler and the manu-
facturer."' 8 3
The strict liability doctrine thus bears important resemblances to
judicial treatment of contractual limitations in insurance contracts; in
both situations many courts now reject the seller's attempted restriction
of that quality of performance which the ordinary buyer may legiti-
mately contemplate. In Greeno v. Clark Equipment Company'8 the court
pointed out the tort doctrine of strict liability: ". . . is hardly more than
what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract doc-
trines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect, and limita-
tion through inconsistencies with express warranties."8 5 The court then
proceeded to state that the "defective condition" on which liability is
based is "a condition not contemplated by the consumer/user and which
is 'unreasonably dangerous' to him or his property, that is, more danger-
ous than would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer/user with
the ordinary knowledge of the community as to its characteristics and
uses.'
86
The product liability rule essentially rests upon the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine: A consumer has the right to expect the safety of the
vended product, an expectation that is known to the manufacturer. Re-
cent interpretations of the strict liability doctrine demonstrate the im-
181 Id.; cf. Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962) (manu-
facturer liable for defective component on theory of breach of implied warranty). Most
jurisdictions do not hold manufacturers strictly liable for defective components although
they may be vicariously liable for the negligence of the component's supplier. Ford Motor
Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); Markel v. Spencer, 5 App. Div. 2d 400, 171
N.Y.S.2d 770 (1958), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 958, 157 NXE.2d 713, 184 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1959). See
generally Annot., 3 ATL.R.3d 1016 (1965).
182322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
18 3 Id. at 274.
184237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
185 Id. at 429.
180 Id.
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portance of this basic concept. Thus, the California supreme court
in Seely v. White Motor Company8 7 held that the doctrine could not be
used to justify recovery for economic loss caused by a defect rendering
a product unsuitable for a particular purpose. The court held that re-
covery for such loss must be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
As one commentator has pointed out:
One suspects that the California Supreme Court wished to establish
a clear-cut category-economic loss-into which most claims surround-
ing just what expectations of quality and utility of a product were
entertained by manufacturer and consumer would be placed. This
category will be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, a general
plan designed to measure the reasonableness of these expectations.188
The products liability doctrine, paralleling the approach of courts
in other fields set forth above, derives liability from the relationship of
the parties rather than from the terms of the contract, and measures that
liability by examining the nature of the expectations of the parties enter-
ing into the transaction.
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages we have somewhat arbitrarily selected several
fairly narrow areas of law to illustrate our hypothesis. That changes are
taking place within each of these areas is clear enough; what is not so
clear on the basis of traditional analysis is that these changes may be
viewed as related to one another both functionally and doctrinally, and
therein lies what we assert to be the value of our hypothesis. The func-
tional relationship consists in the increased judicial sensitivity, explicit
or implicit, to the role of the individual in today's integrated social order;
the doctrinal relationship consists in the judicial adaptation to that func-
tion, again often implicitly, of principles rooted in early common law
status concepts, particularly in the concept of a public service enterprise.
Accepting the inevitability of large-scale production, these concepts pro-
tect the individual, as consumer, from the purveyor's disclaimer of
liability for negligent conduct, and insure that the public service enter-
prise will provide those services which the average man can reasonably
expect. Recognizing the importance of trade and professional organiza-
tions, courts may use these concepts to protect the individual as a
producer, safeguarding his interest in becoming and remaining a member
18763 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
188 Comment, Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Products: Continuing Contro-
versy over the Law to be Applied, 54 CAm. L. Rav. 1681, 1715-16 (1966). For a
criticism of the court's approach in Seely, see Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 S.Ax. L. REV. 974, 980-82, 1001-03
(1966).
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of such organizations and in participating in their affairs. Through the
variety of factual situations, each of them requiring independent analysis
and calling for unique solutions, run these common threads.
Recognition of the doctrinal roots which underlie these developments
serves also to highlight the gradual and continuing nature of the process.
Invocation of new concepts inevitably provokes questions as to the role
of the courts in bringing about legal change, and properly so-concededly,
there are limits to the judicial function. It is important, however, to re-
member that early status concepts were themselves primarily the product
of judicial decision and that their gradual transformation represented
judicial response to a then changing society; the common law has never
been a body of static principles but a dynamic process. The great challenge
to the legal system today is accommodation to the new industrial state.
Rigid dependence upon legalistic concepts associated with nineteenth
century society is as anachronistic for that purpose as is use of classical
economic theory to explain the modern economy. 89 The storehouse of
the common law can and does supply the courts of today with the ap-
propriate tools to meet the challenge.
189 See J. G, BRAn, THE NEW INDUSTiAL STATE 179-97 (1967).
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